In this paper we propose a game-theoretic model to analyze events similar to the 2009 DARPA Network Challenge, which was organized by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for exploring the roles that the Internet and social networks play in incentivizing wide-area collaborations. The challenge was to form a group that would be the first to find the locations of ten moored weather balloons across the United States. We consider a model in which N people (who can form groups) are located in some topology with a fixed coverage volume around each person's geographical location. We consider various topologies where the players can be located such as the Euclidean d-dimension space and the vertices of a graph. A balloon is placed in the space and a group wins if it is the first one to report the location of the balloon. A larger team has a higher probability of finding the balloon, but we assume that the prize money is divided equally among the team members. Hence there is a competing tension to keep teams as small as possible.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of communication technologies, and the Web in particular, we can now harness the collective abilities of large groups of people to accomplish tasks with unprecedented speed, accuracy, and scale. In the popular culture and the business literature, this process has come to be known as crowdsourcing [12] . Crowdsourcing has been used in various tasks such as labeling of images [16] , predicting protein structures [10] , and posting and solving Human Intelligence Tasks in Amazon's Mechanical Turk [14] . An important class of crowdsourcing problems demand a large recruitment along with an extremely fast execution. Examples of such time-critical social mobilization tasks include search-and-rescue operations in the times of disasters, evacuation in the event of terrorist attacks, and distribution of medicines during epidemics.
The DARPA Network Challenge: A good example of collaboratition is The 2009 DARPA Network Challenge [1] , an event organized by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for exploring the roles that the Internet and social networks play in incentivizing wide-area collaborations. The strategy of the winning team from MIT is outlined in [6] . Their main focus is on the mechanics of the group formation process in the DARPA Network Challenge whereas in this paper we try to analyze the structures of the groups which form in Nash Equilibria.
Related Work: Douceur and Moscibroda [3] addressed a problem close to the spirit of the DARPA Network Challenge. They address the problem of motivating people to install and run a distributed service, like peer-to-peer systems. Their focus is on incentivizing the growth of a single group whereas in this paper we take a bird's-eye view and try to analyze the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria.
Some recent results [9, 5] analyze the structures of Nash Equilibria. A well-studied parameter related to Nash equilibria is the price of anarchy [13] . However as observed in [9, 5] , bounds on the structures of Nash equilibria lead to approximate bounds on the price of anarchy as well but not necessarily the other way around.
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There is an entire body of literature in Economics which is closely related to the model we consider in this paper. There have also been studies on how the rules of coalition formation affect the stability of environmental agreements between countries [11] . In the last year there have been two papers which consider events similar to the DARPA Network Challenge [8, 7] .
OUR MODEL
There is a set of N players, each covering a region of space within the total volume A. In particular, in the Euclidean space, we assume each player covers a ball of radius one centered at his location; in the discrete case we view the players as occupying the vertices of a graph and assume each player covers himself and his neighbors. Players are allowed to organize themselves into a collection of disjoint groups partitioning the set of players. In this work, we do not consider the precise dynamics of group formation, but instead we focus on analyzing the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria. Once the groups are formed, we envision the balloon being placed in the space. 1 We say the balloon falls within a group S if the location of the balloon is in the coverage of S; a group S wins if it is the first one to report the location of the balloon. To model this we assume the probability that the balloon falls within a group S is AS/A, where AS is the total volume covered by the players in S and A is the total volume. The prize money M is given to the group that wins, and the money received by a group is split equally among all members of that group. We note the balloon can be placed anywhere in the space, and we do not know where it will be placed. Hence the probability of any of the groups (which might form) finding the balloon first is the same and we do not consider this common factor hereafter.
Risk aversion [15] is the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff [15] . Risk aversion is a natural assumption when we consider money and people: most of us would accept a guaranteed payment of say X dollars than a 50% chance of receiving 2X and a 50% chance of getting nothing, especially if X is large (the DARPA Challenge had a prize money of $40,000). Constant relative risk aversion means that the ratio of the increase in the utility to the increase in the risk taken is constant. Assuming that the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is constant, the isoelastic utility function for money x is given by u(x) = where 0 ≤ r < 1 is the risk aversion factor [4] . For r = 1 we take the utility to be the natural logarithm. Here r = 0 means there is no risk aversion. For simplicity we scale up everything by a factor of 1 − r to get a concave utility function given by u(x) = x 1−r where 0 < r < 1. The expected utility for a player who is a member of a group S is given by
is the probability that the balloon fall within S. Consider two players who have disjoint area of coverage. If they are on their own, then their expected utility is u = (
wherea is the area they can cover. If they join together to form a group then their expected utility is u ′ = (
Therefore two people whose coverage areas are disjoint will always join together, not matter what the risk aversion factor r is. The intuition is that the value of r affects how much overlapping coverage areas is allowed for it to be beneficial for people to join together. The smaller the value of r the lesser the overlap must be between the coverage areas of the players for it to make sense for them to merge.
We assume that the balloon is placed in a location covered by at least one player. Given a partition S1, . . . , S ℓ of all the players into groups, we now ask whether it forms an equilibrium. More formally, we allow two types of actions:
1. Two groups Si and Sj can decide to merge. We say this operation is incentivized only if each player in Si and Sj would increase their expected utility by merging.
2.
A member x of group Si may defect to join a different group Sj. We say this operation is incentivized only if both x's expected utility and the expected utility of each player in Sj increase after the defect.
A given partition is a Nash Equilibrium if no merge or defect operation is incentivized, i.e., no player can do better by unilaterally changing his group.
OUR RESULTS
We consider the social welfare from the viewpoint of the agency which hosts the event described by our model. First we show that the hosting agency needs to offer prize money proportional to the desired size of a largest group or to the desired fraction of the total volume covered if each person must receive a minimum threshold expected utility. 
DEFINITION 3.3. Given a partition of the people into groups, we say a group G is a richest group if its expected utility per person value is at least that of any other group in the partition.
We note that given any partition of people into groups, there always exists at least one richest group. We show the following interesting and unexpected phenomenon: for various different topologies, in every Nash Equilibrium any richest group covers a constant fraction of the total volume. We assume that each point in the space belongs to coverage area of at least one player.
The One-Dimensional (Line) Case
In this section the players are located along a line. We assume each person has a coverage length of one on both sides. Recall for each person x in a group S the expected utility is
where M is the total money, AS is the length covered by group S and A is the total length. We contract the points not covered by any player. Therefore every point in the total length has at least one person whose coverage length contains it. 
The Euclidean d-dimensional Case
In this section we consider the case in which the players are located in a Euclidean d-dimensional space and each person covers a unit ball around himself. The next lemma bounds the ratio of volumes of the union of the two families of balls with the same set of centers but different radii. , z) and j < k. This contradicts the membership of z in P k . So we can apply homothecy: for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we contract each Pi w.r.t point ci by a factor of 1 t to get a region say P ′ i . We note P
′ i ⊆ AU as x ∈ Pi implies d(x, ci) ≤ t and if we denote by x
′ the point to which x is mapped under the contraction, then 
Equality in the triangle inequality gives ci, yj, yi are on the same line and d(ci, yj) = d(ci, yi) which implies yi = yj which is a contradiction. So we have the following two conditions :
We note the bound is tight when all the balls in B are disjoint.
We now give a generalization of Lemma 3. 
PROOF. Suppose there is a player i /
∈ S, who can add a volume of at least (1 − r)V d to the volume covered by S. However, since it is a Nash Equilibrium, either the new expected utility of S on adding this player is less than or equal to the current expected utility of S, hence S would have no incentive in adding the player i. Or else the player i would not have any incentive to move to S, as the projected new expected utility of i is less than or equal to his current expected utility. Since S is a richest group, both these conditions combine to give: 
Rearranging and setting
which is a contradiction.
A simple proof shows that if S is any richest group in a Nash Equilibrium then
where AS is the volume covered by the group S and A is the total volume. 
We are now ready to give a better bound than PROOF. Consider a richest group S in a Nash Equilibrium. By Lemma 3.7, no player outside of S can get his coverage ball to contribute at least (1 − r)V d volume to S, i.e, for every x / ∈ S there is a player s ∈ S such that volume of intersection of balls Bx, Bs of x and s respectively is at least rV d . Let the distance between centers of Bx and Bs be 2a. Lemma 3.9 gives
So each player not in S is at a distance of at most 2δ from some player of S. Therefore the total volume A is covered by the volume A ′ S of the union of the family of balls of radius 2δ + 1 centered at members of S. By Lemma 3.6 we have
The Graph Case
In the discrete version of the problem we assume that the players form the vertex set of an undirected graph. The coverage of a vertex is its closed neighborhood, i.e., a vertex covers itself and all its neighbors. We assume the same utility function as before: Each member x belonging to a group S has expected utility given by
where M is the total money, AS is the union of the closed neighborhoods of the vertices in S and A is the vertex set of the graph. We first show a preliminary lemma which bounds the contribution to a richest group in a Nash Equilibrium by any vertex which is not in the richest group. This lemma can be viewed as a discrete version of Lemma 3.7. In the next theorem we show if the topology is the class of boundeddegree regular graphs, then in any Nash Equilibrium there always exists a group which covers a constant fraction of the total number of vertices. The general graph case does not seem to be hopeful. Recall in all the three topologies (the one-dimensional (line) space, the ddimensional Euclidean space and the bounded-degree regular graphs) considered so far, we were able to show the surprising phenomenon that any richest group in a Nash Equilibrium covers a constant fraction of the total volume/vertices. We show this approach fails for general graphs, i.e., there exist graphs having a Nash Equilibrium in which no richest group covers a constant fraction of the total number of vertices. THEOREM 3.14.
[⋆] There exist graphs which have a Nash Equilibrium in which no richest group covers a constant fraction of the total number of vertices.
Theorem 3.14 implies we need different ideas than those we use previously to tackle the general graph case. In collaboratition events we think it is reasonable to allow a person to defect to another group but not back to his original state of being alone. Under this assumption, we can show there exist graphs which have a Nash Equilibrium in which no group covers a constant fraction of the total number of vertices. THEOREM 3.15.
[⋆]Given any constant 0 < c < 1, under the assumption that defecting to an empty group is not allowed, there exists a graph Gc and a Nash Equilibrium in Gc such that each group in the Nash Equilibrium covers strictly less than a c-fraction of the total number of vertices.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have suggested a game-theoretic model motivated by the DARPA Network Challenge. We analyze the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria. We show for various topologies: a one-dimensional space (line), a d-dimensional Euclidean space, and bounded-degree regular graphs; in any Nash Equilibrium there always exists a group which covers a constant fraction of the total volume. The objective of events like the DARPA Network Challenge is to mobilize a large number of people quickly so that they can cover a big fraction of the total area. Our results suggest that this objective can be met under certain conditions.
The most important open question is to show the existence of Nash equilibria in our model, maybe under some additional assumptions.
